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A Surgeon’s Duty

Dr. Albert Gaillard Hall described a scenario in where he was tricked by his

soldiers; “At our rendezvous, on three successive mornings, men reported sick,

complaining of backache and headache, and with a very heavily coated tongue, but

without other symptoms. Thinking it might prove an oncoming fever, I excused the

first and second lots, and then saw that they were ‘old-soldiering the surgeon.’ Long

afterwards one of the men explained the trick. The camp was surrounded by rosebushes in bloom, and a liberal chewing of rose-leaves a little before sick call

produced the effect I saw on the tongue. This is but an illustration of innumerable

devices to mislead the surgeon and get excused from duty or to escape the
battlefield.” 1

Hall’s frustration with soldiers faking illnesses was an endemic problem that

threatened overall discipline in all Civil War armies, including the Army of the

Potomac. The beginning of the American Civil War proved to the Union side that the

Confederate forces were going to be a much more formidable opponent than had
been initially anticipated. The soldiers and civilians of the Northern side had no
idea the devastation and destruction this war would bring to their families and

Glenna R. Schroeder-Lein, The Encyclopedia of Civil War Medicine (New York, NY:
M.E Sharpe Inc., 2008), 319.
1

livelihoods. The Union struggled mightily as 1861 dragged into 1862. These
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civilian soldiers were inexperienced and undisciplined men who resented and
resisted central authority, generals such as McDowell and McClellan seemed

incompetent at leading armies in battle, and the medical staff was disorganized and

undersupplied. Surgeons encountered many problems as they adjusted to their new
roles as military surgeons, which were often times in complete contradiction with

being a civilian doctor. When one is a civilian doctor, his or her main allegiance is to
the welfare of the patient. However, when one is a military doctor, his or her

allegiance is to their army. When Jonathan Letterman took over as Medical Director
of the Army of the Potomac in August 1862, he inherited an army that would pose

many challenges. All of their problems stemmed from a lack of accountability and
organization, and Letterman would write reforms that would allow him and other
surgeons to instill discipline among their medical staff, soldiers, and even field

officers, effectively providing them with the tools to balance the role of caretaker
with disciplinarian.

The Army of the Potomac was engaged in the Peninsula Campaign from

March 1862 through July 1862. Led by General George B. McClellan, the Union’s

goal was to capture Richmond, which was the capital of the Confederacy at the time.

While the Northern offensive started as a successful operation, General Robert E.
Lee’s aggressive responses were able to turn the tides of battle, and trounce the

Army of the Potomac. Lincoln was extremely disappointed at the result of the

Peninsula Campaign, and saw the severe problems that were taking place in his
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army. 2 Their system of hospitals, ambulances, and distribution of medical supplies
was extremely inefficient and unorganized, but how could it be solved?

Jonathan Letterman would become the answer for Lincoln and his Federal

Army, and his military background would prove to be a crucial stepping-stone to his
eventual assumption of the Medical Director position in the Army of the Potomac.

After finishing Medical School in 1846, Letterman was assigned to a remote military
outpost in Florida in which he was responsible for the lives of approximately 200

men. 3 He spent upwards of three years in the malaria-infested swamps of Florida.

After applying for relocation, he would spend time at a number of different military

outposts. From Minnesota to New Mexico, Letterman would encounter poorly built
outposts, lack of supplies, and rampant exposure to diseases and the elements. 4

While these experiences helped Letterman gain valuable experience, nothing could

prepare him for the litany of issues he was about to encounter in the Union Army in
August of 1862.

As Letterman stepped onto the scene, The Medical Department was under

great scrutiny by generals and soldiers alike. Theodore J. Calhoun, Assistant
Surgeon of the U.S. Army, comments on the image most people had of his

occupation; “The mention of an army surgeon presents to their mind’s eye, a

drunken brute, whose principal employment is to amputate every arm and leg he
Richard Wheeler, Sword Over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan’s
Peninsula Campaign (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1986).
3 Scott McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care (New York, NY: Arcade Publishing, 2013), 22
4 McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who Pioneered
Battlefield Care, 28.
2

can get hold of, to drink all the hospital whiskey.” 5 This representation of the
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medical staff highlights the criticisms many had towards their surgeons and doctors.
They were often viewed as drunken imbeciles who had little medical knowledge,

which led to many soldiers treating them with no respect. Soldiers often reflected
these surgical inadequacies in their diaries and journals, and Colonel Charles S.
Wainwright wrote; “The surgeons themselves know little more; many (most of
them) being poor hands at their trade, and pretty much all treading on new

ground.” 6 To compound their image, generals and other high command officers
resented the surgeon’s authority. Surgeons could send soldiers home at will,

without having to consult anyone else. Colonel W.B. French of the 77th NY wrote to

Surgeon General Hammond complaining about this sentiment; “Our army is not only
becoming greatly reduced by this whole-sale discharged, but is also becoming

demoralized. Men understand and openly say they only have to play sick, get into

the hospital and they can be discharged.” 7 It is clear that officers were fed up with
their surgeons, and were quick to criticize their counterparts. The changes

Letterman made beginning in August 1862 would have a positive influence on the

connotations surgeons had, and would directly confront the serious deficiencies in
the Army of the Potomac.

Medical supplies are one of the most important necessities of any army, and

The Army of the Potomac upon Letterman’s arrival was at a constant dearth for

Theodore J. Calhoun, “Rough Notes of an Army Surgeon’s Experience, during the
Great Rebellion,” The Medical and Surgical Reporter, 1864, 159-160.
6 Allen Nevins, A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S.
Wainwright (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1998), 69.
7 Colonel W.B. French to Surgeon General Wm A. Hammond, 6 January, 1863 in
Regimental Descriptive and Letter Book, 77th New York Infantry, RG 94, NAB
5

even the most basic of items. They did not have enough tents to house all the
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wounded, forcing some of these patients to sleep outside, completely exposed to the
elements. They did not have enough ambulance wagons to quickly retrieve their

wounded victims from the battlefield and bring them to the hospitals, leaving dying

soldiers to fend for themselves for hours, even days. They did not even have enough
food to feed all their soldiers, who were extremely dependent upon their diet in

order to stave off various diseases such, as scurvy. As Kathryn Meier states in her
book Nature’s Civil War, “A dearth of tents and clothes exposed soldiers

unnecessarily to the elements, insufficient rations weakened troops bodies, and
limited medications and hospitals meant that those who inevitably fell ill faced

deficient care.” 8 The Peninsula Campaign is an ideal example of the extreme lack of

supplies in the Army of the Potomac in 1862. Spencer Bonsall, a hospital steward

from the 81st Pennsylvania infantry, wrote in his diary describing a train carrying a

Senator; “If the government would occasionally send a special train with medicines

and bandages for the sick and wounded soldiers, it would be hailed with much more
pleasure than would be a visit from all the Senators and Congressmen of the United
States.” 9 Bonsall perfectly encapsulates the dire situation that was the supplying of

the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1862. One would think that these soldiers

would be excited to see representatives of their government coming to visit them,

Kathryn Shively Meier, Nature’s Civil War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2013), 81.
9 Michael A Flannery and Katherine H Oomens, Well Satisfied With My Position: The
Civil War Journal of Spencer Bonsall (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University
Press, 2007), 56.
8
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but this was simply not the case. Bringing supplies would have been a much more
practical use of this train in the eyes of the surgeons and their patients. Surgeons

had to make due with the little supplies they were given, and it was very taxing on
their conscious to see so many people suffering.

Many surgeons reflect these sentiments in their letters and personal diaries.

Daniel Holt, a surgeon in the Union Army, comments in his diary about the inability
to properly care for soldiers because of their lack of supplies; “The treatment the

poor fellows have to accept is very little and sometimes I think amounts to almost

nothing…We have but the merest apology for anything to help them with- no tents,
no medicines, no clothing.” 10 If there had been accountability within the medical

staff, someone would have kept a close watch on the supplies they were lacking, and
the items they still had an abundance of, allowing surgeons to know at all times

what they had at their disposal. To compound the problem, the logistics of moving
an army with guns, supplies, and soldiers was a difficult task even with the utmost

amount of organization and accountability. Colonel Charles S. Wainright reflects on

the difficulties the Army of the Potomac faced while moving around the Peninsula in
1862; “The road was now awful; my horse sank to his knees at almost every step.

Ammunition and hospital waggons were stuck all along…The road was so narrow at

James M. Greiner, Janet L. Coryell, and James R. Smither, A Surgeon’s Civil War: The
Letters and Diary of Daniel M. Holt, M.D. (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press,
1994), 32.

10
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this point that but one wagon could pass at a time.” 11 Due to these conditions,

coupled with the lack of organization, supplies were constantly in high demand.

Letterman would change the way supplies were organized and accounted for,

and this would allow the surgeons the ability to carefully keep track of all of their

supplies. William Alexander Hammond, the Surgeon General of the United States,
wrote to Letterman when he was appointed Medical Director of the Army of the

Potomac, “You will hold the senior medical officer to a strict accountability for any
deficiency. The time has passed when the excuse of ‘no supplies’ will be

accepted.” 12 Letterman responded by requiring all medical directors to issue

potatoes three times a week, onions twice a week, and bread as much as supplies
would allow. This improvement forced the medical staff to keep more accurate

records of their food through weekly reports that were to be administered to the

surgeons. 13 Also, because all food supplies were watched with a keen eye amongst
surgeons, robbery along the line of distribution declined dramatically, which was a
direct result of this increase in discipline. Furthermore, corps commanders were
expected to submit monthly reports to the corps surgeons regarding camp

conditions, wounded, and sick. Letterman would not tolerate anything other then
these forms as a means of communication, and this led to a higher degree of

11Nevins,

A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright ,

53.
Bennett A. Clements, “Memoir of Jonathan Letterman, M.D.,” Journal of the Military
Service Institution, September 1883, 3.
13McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care 157.
12

accountability owed by the corps commanders to their medical officers. 14 He
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brought greater centralization by not only bringing more accountability and

organization to the supply chain, but by putting such a great emphasis on the chain

itself. No army could function without adequate supplies, and the only way to make

the best use of the supplies was to deliver them in a timely fashion. From this point,
surgeons were able to keep accurate records of all of their supplies by holding their

medical staff accountable, and this change enabled them to more effectively perform
their duties.

Another obstacle many surgeons came in direct contact with were

malingerers. Also referred to as a “hospital rat,” 15 these were soldiers whom

feigned diseases in order to acquire a Medical Certificate of Discharge. 16 Soldiers

would fake many different illnesses and ailments, and often times the medical staff

struggled to decipher whether a patient was truly sick or not. Due to the amount of

patients surgeons would see on a daily basis, most medical examinations were brief.

Knowing this, patients would feign chronic diseases that had multiple symptoms
because it would incite greater belief by the medical staff in the patient’s

problems. 17 Furthermore, due to the lack of knowledge about medical illnesses such
McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care, 158.
15 Schroeder-Lein, The Encyclopedia of Civil War Medicine, 194.
16 Alfred Jay Bollet, Civil War Medicine: Challenges and Triumphs (Tucson, AZ: Galen
Press, Ltd., 2002), 318.
17 John Ordronaux, Hints on the Preservation of Health in Armies, For the Use of
Volunteer Officers and Soldiers Bound With Manual of Instructions for Military
14
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as Post-traumatic stress disorder, anyone claiming to be having these symptoms

was assumed to be shirking. Compared to today’s standards, little was known about

the human body during the war. Of all the great 19th century medical advances, only
anesthesia was available at this time. 18 Due to these shortcomings, many people
who were sick were assumed to be faking, and many others could have avoided

their illnesses with more knowledge. Many malingerers would even resort to drugs
in order to produce a desired effect in their body, such as diarrhea. 19 Letterman

himself found malingerers extremely infuriating, stating “There are always numbers
of skulkers and worthless men in the army who are on the watch for an opportunity
to escape duty, and these are the cases which require the most careful

examination.” 20 These soldiers lacked discipline and were attempting to avoid their

duties by hiding the truth. However, surgeons had many ways of uncovering the

facts about the malingerer’s ailments, and it led to a more disciplined fighting force.
Surgeons were extremely aware of the idea that soldiers would fake certain

problems in order to be relieved of their military obligations. Union surgeons began

to view the returning of malingerers to the front lines as their duty, and showed

Surgeons On the Examination of Recruits and Discharge of Soldiers (1861), in The
American Civil War Series (San Francisco, CA: Norman Publishing, 1990), 27.
18 Eric T. Dean, Jr, Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 51.
19 Ordronaux, Hints on the Preservation of Health in Armies, 27.
20United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Vol XI (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1884), 217.
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great zeal in doing such. 21 Early in the war, surgeons came up with many ways in

order to expose these liars. There were many physical strategies surgeons would

employ to determine the nature of the illness or injury. They would anesthetize the

patient, and most times the arm or leg the patient was complaining did not work

would instantly move. If this were the case, the malingerer would be immediately

sent back to the battlefield. 22 If this did not work, they would also cause physical

pain to the patient to see his reaction, because it was tough to keep up an act when
one experienced extreme pain. However, physical solutions were not always very

effective. Surgeons would play mental games with their patients in order to uncover
the truth. They would question the soldier, and as John Ordronaux states, “by

leading him on vaguely, with irrelevant inquiries touching other disorders, he will
often, if a malingerer, expose himself by confounding symptoms belonging to

dissimilar and opposite diseases.” 23 Often times, soldiers would agree to ailments or
injuries suggested to them by surgeons that were in complete contradiction of what
they were claiming to have wrong with them, thus revealing their lies.

Unfortunately for the malingerers, surgeons had the upper hand in these games of
cat and mouse due to their superior knowledge of the body. John Ordronaux

perfectly sums up this idea in his manual; “The ignorance of symptomatology- of

sympathetic, and consequential manifestations…of the coordination of vital forces
Dean, Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War, 120.
Dean, Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War, 119.
23 Ordronaux, Hints on the Preservation of Health in Armies, 31.
21
22
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and function- in a word, of anatomy and physiologically, renders the majority of
simulators mere physical clowns.” 24

Why would so many soldiers try and escape duty these ways when it was

clear surgeons were on the lookout for malingerers? They were extremely

desperate, and thought that if they knew what they were doing, they would be able

to bamboozle their inspecting doctors. Charles Biddlecom, a Union soldier from the
147th New York State Volunteer Infantry, wrote to his wife “There isn’t a doctor in

the army that can find out who is really sick, or who is making themselves a little

sick and feigning a great deal that does not ail them.” 25 Some soldiers felt that it was
in fact the patients who had the upper hand, but as the war continued, it became
clear to even these men that the surgeons were not to be fooled. The northern
population was often very critical of the surgeons for their treatment of these

malingerers, but ultimately they were just doing the job that was expected of them.

Yes they had to be caretakers and look out for the best interest of their patients, but
most importantly they had to look out for the best interests of the Army of the

Potomac, and those interests revolved around having as many soldiers as possible
available to fight at all times. If a soldier was healthy and could stand the rigors of
battle, he had no choice but remain in the ranks. 26

Ordronaux, Hints on the Preservation of Health in Armies, 27.
Katherine M. Aldridge, No Freedom Shrieker: The Civil War Letters of Union Soldier
Charles Biddlecom (Ithaca, NY: Paramount Market Publishing, Inc., 2012), 121.
26 McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue, 240-241.
24
25
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The ambulance system prior to the arrival of Letterman was also extremely

inefficient, and this was due to a complete lack of discipline. The Second Battle of

Bull Run took place a few weeks after Letterman took over as Medical Director, and
while he had an inkling that the ambulance system was in need of a complete

makeover, this fight would solidify these sentiments. Three days after the battle had
ended, there were still approximately 3,000 wounded Union soldiers lying on the
battlefield. Two days after that, there were still 600 wounded men on the

battlefield. 27 The fact that there were still soldiers uncared for 5 days after the battle

is inexcusable and would certainly cause extreme suffering for those wounded men.

C.H. Salter, an Army of the Potomac soldier stationed at Harrison’s Landing in 1862,
commented on the wounded stranded on the battlefield; “During that day we were
busy in burying the dead and taking care of the wounded. And in going over the

field, the appearance of the dead left lying on the ground was very sad to behold.” 28
The dead and wounded left lying on the battlefield after the fighting was over was

an utter disgrace in the eyes of the Army of the Potomac soldiers. This was a result

of a lack of accountability and discipline amongst the ambulance drivers. They often

deserted the battlefield, and were completely helpless when they were man enough
to stick around; “They refused to give water to the wounded; they refused to assist
in putting the wounded in the ambulances; they were impudent to the medical

George Washington Adams, Doctors in Blue: The Medical History of the Union Army
in the Civil War (New York, NY: Henry Schuman, 1952), 75
28 David Lee Poremba, If I am Found Dead: Michigan Voices From the Civil War (Ann
Arbor, MI: David Lee Poremba, 2006), 43.
27
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officers; they stole blankets and provisions from the scanty stores.” 29 Not only were

the ambulance drivers unhelpful, but they were also extremely detrimental to the

success and efficiency of the Army of the Potomac. Due to the drivers lack of action,
soldiers felt obliged to help their fallen comrades off the battlefield, which often

times was used as an excuse to abandon their duties once they were away from the
front lines. Assistant surgeon H.E. Brown describes a scenario very similar to this;

“Four, and sometimes six of his comrades, would fall out for the purpose of carrying
him away, thus seriously depleting the ranks, and affording opportunity to the

skulkers and cowards to sneak away.” 30 Giving soldiers the opportunity to flee the

battlefield was the last thing the Army of the Potomac needed considering many of
them were looking for any excuse to abandon their posts.

Field officers also contributed to the faulty ambulance system. Often times

they would commandeer the ambulances and use them for non-medical purposes,

perpetuating the depleting number of ambulances available for wounded retrieval.

In September 1862, Adam Gurowski, a Union soldier, comments on the complete

waste of ambulances he witnessed during the Peninsula Campaign; “McClellan has
forty wagons for his staff, and forty ambulances- no danger for the latter being
used.” 31 Gurowski is clearly frustrated with the officers control of ambulances

because they were less likely to get injured, and therefore would often times leave

Adams, Doctors in Blue: The Medical History of the Union Army in the Civil War, 76.
Joseph K. Barnes, The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, Part
I Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Press, 1870), 78.
31 Adam Gurowski, Diary From March 4 1861 to Novermber 12 1862 (New York, NY:
Burt Franklin, 1968), 271.
29
30
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the ambulances sitting idle when they could have been used to help wounded

soldiers. To compound the problem, generals such as McClellan and subordinate

field officers would allow state relief society representatives to retrieve wounded
soldiers on the battlefield, and return them to their home states to recover. More

often than not, these soldiers would never return to duty. 32 Had these men not

returned to their home states, and recovered within the army, it is very likely they
would have seen action on the battlefield again. Between the ambulance drivers,

soldiers on the field, and line officers, Letterman knew that surgeons must have

total authority over the organization of the ambulance system, and this would instill

discipline in all parties involved within the Army of the Potomac.

Letterman knew reforms had to be made at a rapid pace for the Army of the

Potomac to change their fortunes. After receiving a report from Letterman

regarding life in the camp on the Peninsula, McClellan had his Assistant Adjutant

General write General Orders No. 147, which outlined the changes that needed to be

made in the ambulance system. Among many things, the ambulance system lacked

organization, and this order directly addressed that problem. “The ambulance corps
will be organized on the basis of a captain to each army corps as the commandment
of the ambulance corps,” followed by a first lieutenant, second lieutenant, and a

McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care, 120.
32
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sergeant. 33 Each of these men had specific duties they were required to perform.
The captain had the majority of the responsibilities, ranging from weekly

inspections of all the ambulance equipment, to filing detailed reports of each and

every time the ambulance corps was put into action. 34 The order also laid out what
items were to be on each ambulance at all times, and would require specific horses

be assigned to each ambulance wagon, which were to be used for nothing else other
than this task. Furthermore, it detailed whom was to accompany the wagons when

the army was on the move, as well as when they were stationed in camp, as to avoid
any supplies or wagons from going missing. 35 The order also directly confronted

the issue of officers intervening in the ambulance system and commandeering the
wagons for their own use. It states, “Should any officer infringe upon this order

regarding the use of ambulances, &c., he will be reported by the officer in charge to
the commander of the train, all the particulars being given.” 36 Furthermore, this

order addressed the issue of soldiers helping the wounded off the battlefield and

escaping from the fight. The order would not allow anyone to remove the wounded
from the battlefield except the ambulance corps, not affording soldiers the

opportunity to flee from the ranks. Finally, two surgeons were required to

United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Vol XI, 218.
34 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Vol XI, 218.
35 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Vol XI, 219.
36United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Vol XI, 219.
33
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accompany the ambulance trains when on the march, and make sure that all the sick
and wounded were properly taken care of. 37

These changes afforded surgeons the opportunity to instill discipline among

other members of the Army of the Potomac. Being able to ride on the ambulance

wagons to ensure the patients were properly cared for allowed the surgeons to keep
tabs on how competent their staff was. They would not be able to slack off at all if

they had surgeons breathing down their necks criticizing every move they made. It
is evident that ambulances were vital to the work of surgeons, because it was

Letterman’s goal to bring the wounded to the doctors rather than bringing the

doctors to the wounded. 38 By making these reforms, The Army of the Potomac was
giving surgeons full access to the ambulance wagons, which led to an increase in

accountability among all the members of the ambulance corps. If something was
misplaced, or an ambulance wagon was not performing up to set standards,

surgeons would know about it immediately, and the men responsible would be held
accountable. While the ambulance system was improved in order to safely and

quickly remove wounded soldiers from the battlefield, the hospitals they were being
transported to were extremely hectic and unorganized.

Prior to Letterman, The Army of the Potomac’s hospital system was

inadequate and unable to effectively care for the thousands of wounded soldiers
United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Vol XI, 219.
38 McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care, 124.
37
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they would be in charge of. They were organized under a regimental hospital
system, which meant that wounded soldiers would be transported from the

battlefields to their own regiment’s hospital. This would prove to be problematic,
especially during the Peninsula Campaign. In the chaos of battle, it was nearly

impossible to get wounded soldiers to their own regiment’s hospital. Supplying

these separate hospitals was also rather difficult, and this system scattered medical
personnel that would have benefitted from concentrating their forces. 39 Another

problem the regimental system caused was preferential treatment by the medical
staff of their own regiment. At the Battle of Antietam, soldiers stumbled off the

battlefield injured and disoriented, and accidentally entered the wrong regimental
hospital. Often times, the medical staff denied these patients care because they

were not responsible for soldiers from another regiment. 40 While this paper makes

the argument that discipline is key for any army to be successful, this kind of strict

interpretation of the rules by the medical staff was harmful because it did not allow
for soldiers to get the timely treatment they desperately needed. Organization was
vital, but it could not get in the way of performing one’s duty as a member of the
medical staff, which was to save as many lives as possible.

If a wounded soldier was seriously injured, and would need more time and

attention to recover from his injuries, he would be transferred to a general hospital

Horace Cunningham, Field Medical Services at the Battle of Manassas (Athens, GA:
University of Georgia Press, 1968), 45.
40 McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care, 131.
39
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in a major city such as Philadelphia or Washington D.C. These hospitals had their

own set of issues, which had to be addressed. They had no system of admission or

discharge during the summer of 1862, which often times led to recovered soldiers

leaving the hospital and not returning to their regiment. 41 As a result of this faulty
system, the general hospitals were often filled to capacity, and if they weren’t

completely filled, they would often deny soldiers entry because they never had an

accurate headcount of their patients. Often times, soldiers would have to pass the
nights in the ambulances, and wander the streets during the day, going from

hospital to hospital seeking admission. 42 It is no wonder that so many soldiers fell

through the cracks and were able to escape the army once they got to the major
cities. Through all of these problems, it became extremely clear that reforms
needed to be made in a timely fashion.

Letterman revolutionized the hospital system in The Army of the Potomac,

which positively affected the way surgeons were able to instill discipline among the

soldiers. He transformed the regimental hospitals into field aid stations, in order to
keep the slightly wounded closer to the battlefield, with the expectation that they
would return to battle shortly. More seriously injured soldiers were brought to

divisional hospitals further from the front lines. 43 These divisional hospitals were
expected to be able to quickly and efficiently transport their patients to the major

Adams, Doctors in Blue: The Medical History of the Union Army in the Civil War, 27.
Adams, Doctors in Blue: The Medical History of the Union Army in the Civil War, 27.
43 McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care, 132
41
42
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general hospitals if they would take more time and attention to recover. This new
system effectively created a “critical link- missing for most of military medical

history- between the frontline aid stations and the rear-area general hospitals.” 44

This system worked so effectively because it allowed minor injuries to be addressed
quickly and close to the battlefield, while injuries requiring more time and attention
could be brought away from the danger and into the hands of the more experienced
and skilled surgeons. Letterman also warned surgeons to be on the lookout for
stragglers wandering around the hospitals attempting to eat the food and take
advantage of the comforts prepared for the wounded. 45

Surgeons utilized these reforms as a way to inject discipline in the Union

soldiers. By keeping the less injured soldiers near the front lines, these patients

immediately knew that they would not be going to the general hospitals, and would

be expected to fight again very soon. Once soldiers made it to the general hospitals,
they almost never returned to battle, so by keeping them within the army and close

to the front lines, surgeons were effectively maximizing McClellan’s fighting force. 46

Soldiers would only be sent to the large general hospitals in northern cities if they
were seriously injured. Through the actions of the surgeons, soldiers knew they

Richard A. Gabriel and Karen S. Metz, A History of Military Medicine (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1992), 190.
45 Jonathan Letterman, Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac (New York:
Appleton & Company, 1866), 100.
46 McGaugh, Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War Doctor Who
Pioneered Battlefield Care, 130-131.
44
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would not escape their duties due to miniscule injuries, and this forced them to
accept the reality that they would have to fight their way out of the war.

When people imagine surgeons from the American Civil War, most of them

will envision a man covered in the blood and guts of wounded men, bent over an

operating table sawing and carving their way through a seemingly endless amount
of bones, muscles, and tendons. While these visions are based in fact, most people

fail to recognize the larger roles surgeons played. Of course they were supposed to
look out for every individual soldier, providing the most efficient and helpful care
they could with the supplies they had. However, more importantly, they were

expected to uphold the discipline of the military, instilling accountability and

responsibility into the soldiers. With the all the dilemmas The Army of the Potomac

was facing heading into the summer of 1862, the overarching problem was a

complete lack of discipline. When Letterman took over as Medical Director on July

4, 1862, he made many reforms in hopes of solving this problem. Through his work,

surgeons were provided with all of the necessary means in order to instill discipline
among their patients, their medical staff, and their field officers, and it transformed
the Army of the Potomac from an unorganized army, into a well trained and highly
disciplined fighting force.
Historiography:
Over the years, there has been a vast amount of research done about the

medical practices during the American Civil War. Compared to today’s standards,
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the knowledge and technology they had to work with was hardly comparable, which
has sparked a great deal of interest within scholars in recent years. Surgeon in Blue:
Jonathan Letterman, The Civil War Doctor Who Pioneered Battlefield Care, by Scott
McGaugh, is able to accurately shed light on the problems Letterman was facing

when he took over as Medical Director, and subsequently the changes he made to

counter them. The reforms he made, such as the ambulance system and system of
triage of the wounded, still impact the way we treat patients today, solidifying his

legacy upon modern medicine and battlefield care. 47 This book intertwines with this

body of work because it is able to convey the extreme adversity and pressure

Letterman was facing, while at the same time placing the reader right in the middle
of the Army of the Potomac during the times of reform.

Kathryn Meier’s Nature’s Civil War attempts to highlight the relationship

between soldiers in Virginia in 1862 and the surrounding physical environment.
Due to the lack of food and medicine, combined with undependable supply lines,
soldiers would often have to be personally responsible for their food intake and

overall health. This forced them to leave camp and roam the countryside in search

of food and other necessities, which led to conflicts with their superior officers. 48 As

Letterman improved the supply chain, and kept better records of food and

medicines, soldiers felt less and less need to provide for themselves. Meier’s book
Rebecca Hill, “McGaugh, Scott. Surgeon in Blue: Jonathan Letterman, the Civil War
Doctor Who Pioneered Battlefield Care,” Library Journal (2013): 87.
48 Ethan S. Rafuse, "Nature's Civil War: Common Soldiers and the Environment in
1862 Virginia,” America’s Civil War (2014): 68-69.
47
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was also vital to this paper because it highlighted the strained relationship between
surgeons and their patients. As discussed through this paper, soldiers would have
to balance their role of caregiver with disciplinarian, which often times led to
soldier’s resentment of their medical staff.

Shook Over Hell, by Eric T. Dean, Jr. attempts to draw comparisons between

the trauma endured among soldiers in the Vietnam War and the American Civil War.
His work was particularly important to this paper because it shed better light on the
mental illnesses often associated with the Civil War, and showed that while Union

soldiers came home to a celebration and much more warm welcoming compared to
Vietnam soldiers, they faced the same emotional trauma upon exiting the war. 49

Because of the little amount that was known about mental illnesses, often times
soldiers complaining of symptoms of Post-Traumatic stress were thought to be

malingerers, which adds another wrinkle to uncovering the truth behind soldiers’
injuries.

A.J. Bollet’s Civil War Medicine: Challenges and Triumphs was also critical to

this body of work. It provided great insight on malingering and ways surgeons
would combat these undisciplined soldiers. Reading first-hand accounts of

surgeons reacting to malingerers allows one to position themselves in their shoes,
and think as critically as these surgeons had to at a moment’s notice. Bollet also

focuses a great deal on the evolution of the hospital system, and the vital role

Sara L. Knox, “Shook Over Hell (Book Review),” Journal of American Culture
(1999): 111.
49
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Letterman played in that process, further lending itself to the work in this paper.
Finally, while many writers focus on injuries sustained during battle and their

consequences, Bollet is able to contribute a great deal of information to the diseases
and ailments soldiers would encounter in the camps and hospitals. While they did
not include severe flesh wounds or broken bones, these diseases were equally as
devastating, and Bollet’s explanation of these diseases proves this point.

George Washington Adam’s Doctors in Blue is a vital addition to this body of

work. Starting with the First Battle of Bull Run, Adams is able to accurately portray
the litany of issues the Army of the Potomac was facing in the first two years of the
war. From there, he goes into detail about the hiring of Letterman as Medical

Director, and the subsequent changes he made and how they impacted the Army of

the Potomac and the whole Union Army in future battles. This paper will build off of
Adams work by highlighting not only how these changes positively transformed the
Army of the Potomac, but also how the surgeons were afforded more
responsibilities as a result.

Sword Over Richmond; An Eyewitness History of McClellan’s Peninsula

Campaign, by Richard Wheeler, provides great background on The Army of the

Potomac’s advance to Richmond by way of both eyewitness accounts and secondary
sources. This compilation contributed greatly to this work by providing the

framework from which problems and solutions to those problems arose within the
Army of the Potomac. Even though there was a complete lack of mention of

Letterman and the necessity of his services, Wheeler has done an excellent job of
telling the story of The Peninsula Campaign in an unbiased and detailed way.
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For years, historians have debated the significance of the surgeon’s role in

the American Civil War. It has been concluded time and time again that the ability of
an army’s surgeons was vital to its success both on and off the battlefield. While

many writers have focused on surgeons as caregivers and lifesavers in the Civil War,
few scholars have tried to understand where their role of disciplinarian fit into this
job description. This paper will combine the reforms made to the Army of the

Potomac in the summer of 1862 with the expanding role surgeons played in the war,
in hopes of explaining how these surgeons were able to balance the role of doctor
with the job requirement of instilling discipline within the military.
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